Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and WittgensteinABSTRACT Phenomenology and logical positivism both offer to an empirical-verifiability measuring stick of mental or linguistic content. The acceptance of this metre confronted them with the equivalent job how to understand the opposite as a subject with his throw experience, if the cosmos and nature of the Others experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, still he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with collar the Others feelings and sensations. Carnaps solution was to embracing behaviourism and eliminate the idea of clandestine sensations, alone portism has known difficulties. Heidegger skint this impasse by suggesting that each somebodys being included being-with, an born(p) efficiency for understanding the Other. To be human is to be hard-wired to make feel of the Other without having to verify the Others private sensations. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutionary self-asserting for conspecific animals to recognize each other and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also spurned the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms rough private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, Im in pain, like a bid of pain, functions to get the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgensteins theory shows how Daseins being-with includes primitive adaptative behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors argon parti each(prenominal)y superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions. I. initiation there are obvious and important ways in which uninflected and Continental philosophy differ, but this should not make us acquit their thematic and historical similarities. Both traditions had their roots in phenomenalistic theories that attem pted to geld all meaning to the immediately given. Even though phenomenology was more unsparing in construing what was immediately given, neither phenomenology nor logical positivism could do jurist to our understanding of the subjectivity of other people. Heidegger and Wittgenstein each dealt with this problem in grotesque but complementary ways.Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to the verifiability criterion for meaning (verificationism for short). Logical positivists emphasized linguistic meaning, and in their most antimetaphysical arrange insist that a synthetic sentence is meaningful for a person lonesome(prenominal) if that person could use experience to discover the sentences truth-value. Husserl was more arouse in thoughts about the existence and nature of phenomena and believed that they gained meaning only by means of acts of verification.Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein philosophical system Philosophical PapersHusserl, Carnap, He idegger, and WittgensteinABSTRACT Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Others experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Others feelings and sensations. Carnaps solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each persons being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other. To be human is to be hard-wired to make sense of the Other without having to verify the Others private sensations. I suggest that being-with emerged from an evolutionary imperative for c onspecific animals to recognize each other and to coordinate their activities. Wittgenstein also rejected the verifiability criterion. He theorized that the meaning of a term is its usage and that terms about private sensations were meaningful because they have functions in our language-games. For example, Im in pain, like a cry of pain, functions to get the attention of others and motivate others to help. Wittgensteins theory shows how Daseins being-with includes primitive adaptive behavior such as cries, smiles, and threatening or playful gesture. As Dasein is acculturated, these behaviors are partially superseded by functionally equivalent linguistic expressions. I. IntroductionThere are obvious and important ways in which analytic and continental philosophy differ, but this should not make us overlook their thematic and historical similarities. Both traditions had their roots in phenomenalistic theories that attempted to reduce all meaning to the immediately given. Even though p henomenology was more generous in construing what was immediately given, neither phenomenology nor logical positivism could do justice to our understanding of the subjectivity of other people. Heidegger and Wittgenstein each dealt with this problem in unique but complementary ways.Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to the verifiability criterion for meaning (verificationism for short). Logical positivists emphasized linguistic meaning, and in their most antimetaphysical stage asserted that a synthetic sentence is meaningful for a person only if that person could use experience to discover the sentences truth-value. Husserl was more interested in thoughts about the existence and nature of phenomena and believed that they gained meaning only through acts of verification.